Radical Interpretation and Moore's Paradox

Bibliographic Data

ID20142587
AuthorsHamid Vahid (0000-0001-9064-0877, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume74
Issue2
Pages146-163
Publication date2008-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00013.x
OpenAlexW1537197992
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited16

Moore's sentences of the form “P & ∼I believe that P” and “P & I believe that ∼P” are thought to be paradoxical because they cannot be properly asserted despite being possibly true. Solutions to the paradox usually explain the oddity of such sentences in terms of phenomena as diverse as the pragmatics of speech acts, nature of belief or justification. In this paper I shall argue that despite their seemingly different approaches to the problem, there is a single strategy that underlies all such proposals. Having criticized these suggestions, I shall defend my own solution according to which Moorean sentences are defective not because of some associated logical impropriety but because their assertion violates a certain interpretive constraint, viz., the principle of charity, on an adequate theory of meaning

Appearance of impropriety · Assertion · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Epistemology · Implicature · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Minimalism (technical communication) · Pragmatics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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