Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief

Bibliographic Data

ID20141835
AuthorsJohn N Williams (0000-0002-5473-5382, Singapore Management University, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume76
Issue3
Pages221-248
Publication date2010-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01073.x
OpenAlexW2110179855
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited35

In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore‐paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach ; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore‐paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach , one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p . So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore‐paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach , being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p . So if I have a conscious omissive Moore‐paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second‐order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective‐interpretation approach , broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore‐paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective‐interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious‐belief approaches

Assertion · Belief revision · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Order (exchange) · Sentence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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