Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox

Bibliographic Data

ID20143371
AuthorsJohn N Williams (0000-0002-5473-5382, Singapore Management University, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume81
Issue1
Pages27-47
Publication date2015-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12038
OpenAlexW2121023139
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited15

J ohn Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “ G . E . M oore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of E llie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of E llie is D i, a dialetheist who asserts or believes that The R ussell set includes itself but I believe that it is not the case that the R ussell set includes itself. Since any adequate explanation of M oore's paradox must handle commissive assertions and beliefs as well as omissive ones, it must deal with D i as well as engage E llie. I give such an explanation. I argue that neither E llie's assertion nor her belief is irrational yet both are absurd. Likewise neither D i's assertion nor her belief is irrational yet in contrast neither is absurd. I conclude that not all M oore‐paradoxical assertions or beliefs are irrational and that the syntax of Moore's examples is not sufficient for the absurdity found in them

Absurdism · Absurdity · Assertion · Epistemology · Irrational number · Set (abstract data type) · Sincerity · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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