Parity Demystified
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142776 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Erik Carlson (0000-0002-1558-3865, Uppsala University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 119-128 |
| Publication date | 2010-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01063.x |
| OpenAlex | W4238582662 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 4 |
Ruth Chang has defended a concept of “parity”, implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure notion of parity more precise, by defining it in terms of the standard value relations. Given certain plausible assumptions, the suggested definiens is shown to state a necessary and sufficient condition for parity, as this relation is envisaged by Chang
Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Parity (physics) · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality
The Multidimensional Structure of ‘better than’
Putting costs and benefits of ordeals together
A Dissolution of the Repugnant Conclusion
Incommensurability and healthcare priority setting
Incommensurability and population-level bioethics
Spectrum Arguments, Parity and Persistency
Parity, Imprecise Comparability and the Repugnant Conclusion
Incommensurability as Vagueness
Subjective values should be sharp
Classifying comparability problems in a way that matters
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,1 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2024 (9) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |