Erik Carlson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597550 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erik Carlson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erik |
| FAMILY NAME | Carlson |
| SIGNATURE | CARLSON E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1558-3865 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 31 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 31 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Higher-Order Control: An Argument for Moral Luck
In this paper, we give a new argument for the existence of moral luck. The argument is based on a manipulation case in which two agents both lack second-order control over their actions, but one of them has first-order control. Our argument is, we argue, in several respects stronger than standard arguments for moral luck. Five possible objections to the argument are considered, and its general significance for the debate on moral luck is briefly …
Pitcovski’s explanation-based account of harm
In a recent article in this journal, Eli Pitcovski puts forward a novel, explanation-based account of harm. We seek to show that Pitcovski’s account, and his arguments in favor of it, can be substantially improved. However, we also argue that, even thus improved, the account faces a dilemma. The dilemma concerns the question of what it takes for an event, E, to explain why a state, P, does not obtain. Does this require that P would have obtained …
Benefits are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit
We have argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) violates the plausible adequacy condition that an act that would harm an agent cannot leave her much better off than an alternative act that would benefit her. In a recent paper in this journal, however, Neil Feit objects that our argument presupposes questionable counterfactual backtracking. He also argues that CCA proponents can justifiably reject the condition…
Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence
Plural harm: Plural problems
The counterfactual comparative account of harm faces problems in cases that involve overdetermination and preemption. An influential strategy for dealing with these problems, drawing on a suggestion made by Derek Parfit, is to appeal to plural harm —several events together harming someone. We argue that the most well-known version of this strategy, due to Neil Feit, as well as Magnus Jedenheim Edling’s more recent version, is fatally flawed. We a…
Unruh's hybrid account of harm
Charlotte Unruh has recently put forward a hybrid account of what it is to suffer harm – one that combines comparative and non‐comparative elements. We raise two problems for Unruh's account. The first concerns killing and death; the second concerns the causing of temporarily low or high welfare
Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem
In a recent article in this journal, Justin Klocksiem proposes a novel response to the widely discussed failure to benefit problem for the counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA). According to Klocksiem, proponents of CCA can deal with this problem by distinguishing between facts about there being harm and facts about an agent's having done harm. In this reply, we raise three sets of problems for Klocksiem's approach
On Some Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics
At least since Derek Parfit presented his “Mere Addition Paradox,” the difficulties of formulating a viable population axiology have been widely recognized. Building on Parfit’s work, a number of philosophers have proved impossibility theorems, showing that certain plausible adequacy conditions are mutually inconsistent. The most impressive and important such results are due to Gustaf Arrhenius. His theorems involve more compelling adequacy condi…
Causal Accounts of Harming
A popular view of harming is the causal account (CA), on which harming is causing harm . CA has several attractive features. In particular, it appears well equipped to deal with the most important problems for its main competitor, the counterfactual comparative account (CCA). However, we argue that, despite its advantages, CA is ultimately an unacceptable theory of harming. Indeed, while CA avoids several counterexamples to CCA, it is vulnerable …
Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and well-being levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive acc…
A Discussion of Strategies for recording Babbitt’s Composition for Twelve Instruments
This article talks about the strategies used and the problems encountered in the author's process of making a recording of Milton Babbitt's Composition for Twelve Instruments. In order to achieve an accurate and compelling recording on a restrictive budget, each gesture of the piece was recorded individually and later assembled into a coherent whole on the computer. Various issues of rhythm, pitch, dynamics, and phrasing needed to be evaluated an…
The Significance of Tiny Contributions: Barnett and Beyond
In a discussion of Parfit's Drops of Water case, Zach Barnett has recently proposed a novel argument against “No Small Improvement”; that is, the claim that a single drop of water cannot affect the magnitude of a thirsty person's suffering. We first show that Barnett's argument can be significantly strengthened, and also that the fundamental idea behind it yields a straightforward argument for the transitivity of equal suffering (a much stronger …
Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm
In a recent article in this journal, I claimed that the widely held counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA) violates two very plausible principles about harm and prudential reasons. Justin Klocksiem argues, in a reply, that CCA is in fact compatible with these principles. In this rejoinder, I shall try to show that Klocksiem’s defense of CCA fails
Organic Unities and Conditionalism About Final Value
Bontly on Harm and the Non-Identity Problem
The ‘non-identity problem’ raises a well-known challenge to the person-affecting view, according to which an action can be wrong only if it affects someone for the worse. In a recent article, however, Thomas D. Bontly proposes a novel way to solve the non-identity problem in person-affecting terms. Bontly's argument is based on a contrastive causal account of harm. In this response, we argue that Bontly's argument fails even assuming that the con…
Well-Being without Being? A Reply to Feit
In a recent Utilitas article, Neil Feit argues that every person occupies a well-being level of zero at all times and possible worlds at which she fails to exist. Views like his face the ‘problem of the subject’: how can someone have a well-being level in a scenario where she lacks intrinsic properties? Feit argues that this problem can be solved by noting, among other things, that a proposition about a person can be true at a possible world in w…
Non-Archimedean extensive measurement with incomparability
The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued: The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued
Journal Article The Small‐Improvement Argument Rescued Get access Erik Carlson Erik Carlson University of Uppsala Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 242, January 2011, Pages 171–174, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.664.x Published: 14 December 2010
Parity Demystified
Ruth Chang has defended a concept of “parity”, implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure notion of parity more precise, by defining it in terms of the standard value relations. Given certain plausible assumptions, the suggested definiens …
Higher Values and Non‐Archimedean Additivity
Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatiblewith the existence of “higher values”, any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non‐standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly sim…
Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability
John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing
Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield
The well‐known “Consequence Argument” for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; “Principle Beta”. Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to Beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the Consequence Argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples
Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action
The Badness of Killing and Letting Die
Aggregating Harms — Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches
It is plausible to claim that it is morally worse to kill an innocent person than to give any number of people a mild one‐hour headache. Alaistar Norcross has argued that consequentialists, at least, should reject this claim. According to him, any harm that can befall a person can be morally outweighed by a sufficient number of very small harms. He gives a general argument for this view, and tries to show, by means of an argument from analogy, th…
Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism
Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability
John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing
Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action
Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit
In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence
The Significance of Tiny Contributions: Barnett and Beyond
In a discussion of Parfit's Drops of Water case, Zach Barnett has recently proposed a novel argument against “No Small Improvement”; that is, the claim that a single drop of water cannot affect the magnitude of a thirsty person's suffering. We first show that Barnett's argument can be significantly strengthened, and also that the fundamental idea behind it yields a straightforward argument for the transitivity of equal suffering (a much stronger …
The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism
Frances Howard-Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard-Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘prod…
Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert
This paper criticizes the ‘justice-adjusted’ consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this
Cyclical preferences and rational choice
A note on Moore's organic unities
Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert
This paper criticizes the ‘justice-adjusted’ consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this
Van Inwagen on Determinism and Moral Responsibility
The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism
Frances Howard-Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard-Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘prod…
Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism
Aggregating Harms — Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches
It is plausible to claim that it is morally worse to kill an innocent person than to give any number of people a mild one‐hour headache. Alaistar Norcross has argued that consequentialists, at least, should reject this claim. According to him, any harm that can befall a person can be morally outweighed by a sufficient number of very small harms. He gives a general argument for this view, and tries to show, by means of an argument from analogy, th…
The Badness of Killing and Letting Die
Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action
Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield
The well‐known “Consequence Argument” for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; “Principle Beta”. Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to Beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the Consequence Argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples
Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability
John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing
Higher Values and Non‐Archimedean Additivity
Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatiblewith the existence of “higher values”, any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non‐standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly sim…
Parity Demystified
Ruth Chang has defended a concept of “parity”, implying that two items may be evaluatively comparable even though neither item is better than or equally good as the other. This article takes no stand on whether there actually are cases of parity. Its aim is only to make the hitherto somewhat obscure notion of parity more precise, by defining it in terms of the standard value relations. Given certain plausible assumptions, the suggested definiens …
Non-Archimedean extensive measurement with incomparability
The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued: The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued
Journal Article The Small‐Improvement Argument Rescued Get access Erik Carlson Erik Carlson University of Uppsala Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 61, Issue 242, January 2011, Pages 171–174, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.664.x Published: 14 December 2010
Well-Being without Being? A Reply to Feit
In a recent Utilitas article, Neil Feit argues that every person occupies a well-being level of zero at all times and possible worlds at which she fails to exist. Views like his face the ‘problem of the subject’: how can someone have a well-being level in a scenario where she lacks intrinsic properties? Feit argues that this problem can be solved by noting, among other things, that a proposition about a person can be true at a possible world in w…
Organic Unities and Conditionalism About Final Value
Bontly on Harm and the Non-Identity Problem
The ‘non-identity problem’ raises a well-known challenge to the person-affecting view, according to which an action can be wrong only if it affects someone for the worse. In a recent article, however, Thomas D. Bontly proposes a novel way to solve the non-identity problem in person-affecting terms. Bontly's argument is based on a contrastive causal account of harm. In this response, we argue that Bontly's argument fails even assuming that the con…
Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm
In a recent article in this journal, I claimed that the widely held counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA) violates two very plausible principles about harm and prudential reasons. Justin Klocksiem argues, in a reply, that CCA is in fact compatible with these principles. In this rejoinder, I shall try to show that Klocksiem’s defense of CCA fails
Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit
Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and well-being levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive acc…
A Discussion of Strategies for recording Babbitt’s Composition for Twelve Instruments
This article talks about the strategies used and the problems encountered in the author's process of making a recording of Milton Babbitt's Composition for Twelve Instruments. In order to achieve an accurate and compelling recording on a restrictive budget, each gesture of the piece was recorded individually and later assembled into a coherent whole on the computer. Various issues of rhythm, pitch, dynamics, and phrasing needed to be evaluated an…
The Significance of Tiny Contributions: Barnett and Beyond
In a discussion of Parfit's Drops of Water case, Zach Barnett has recently proposed a novel argument against “No Small Improvement”; that is, the claim that a single drop of water cannot affect the magnitude of a thirsty person's suffering. We first show that Barnett's argument can be significantly strengthened, and also that the fundamental idea behind it yields a straightforward argument for the transitivity of equal suffering (a much stronger …
On Some Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics
At least since Derek Parfit presented his “Mere Addition Paradox,” the difficulties of formulating a viable population axiology have been widely recognized. Building on Parfit’s work, a number of philosophers have proved impossibility theorems, showing that certain plausible adequacy conditions are mutually inconsistent. The most impressive and important such results are due to Gustaf Arrhenius. His theorems involve more compelling adequacy condi…
Causal Accounts of Harming
A popular view of harming is the causal account (CA), on which harming is causing harm . CA has several attractive features. In particular, it appears well equipped to deal with the most important problems for its main competitor, the counterfactual comparative account (CCA). However, we argue that, despite its advantages, CA is ultimately an unacceptable theory of harming. Indeed, while CA avoids several counterexamples to CCA, it is vulnerable …
Plural harm: Plural problems
The counterfactual comparative account of harm faces problems in cases that involve overdetermination and preemption. An influential strategy for dealing with these problems, drawing on a suggestion made by Derek Parfit, is to appeal to plural harm —several events together harming someone. We argue that the most well-known version of this strategy, due to Neil Feit, as well as Magnus Jedenheim Edling’s more recent version, is fatally flawed. We a…
Epistemology (24 works) · Philosophy (22 works) · Free Will and Agency (14 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (13 works) · Economics (12 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Law and economics (11 works) · Harm (10 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (10 works) · Positive economics (10 works)