Classical and team reasoning in the Centipede Game
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143040 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Sklar (0000-0003-0079-3517, National Democratic Institute (NDI) Washington D.C. USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 225-239 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12522 |
| OpenAlex | W4395084593 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 38 |
This study analyses behaviour in non‐zero‐sum finite multi‐stage games, particularly the Centipede Game. The classical Nash Equilibrium fails to explain empirical behaviour and intuitive logic and has therefore been challenged. This paper introduces the ‘Pure Collective Equilibrium’, or PCE, which describes the equilibrium reached when agents assess their utility not by their own payoffs but by the mean collective payoff of the team, as outlined by some team‐reasoning hypotheses. Classical behaviour and purely collective team reasoning then both represent special cases—the first in which agents and their counterparts are on the Nash Equilibrium path, and the second in which agents and their counterparts are purely collective team reasoners. It is argued that agents intentionally and consistently deviate from classical rationality in the Centipede Game, even in the absence of philanthropic altruists or error‐plagued populations
Economics · Epistemology · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Normal-form game · Rationality · Repeated game · Stochastic game · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Philosophy
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Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
Non-Cooperative Games
Thinking as a Team
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation
Cooperation, fairness and team reasoning
Beyond Individual Choice
The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality
Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory
A five‐factor integrative taxonomy of strategic reasoning in dyadic games
Exploring cooperation and competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol analysis
The Evolution of Cooperation in the Centipede Game with Finite Populations
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Rationality in Extensive-Form Games
Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit
| Highly cited | No |
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