Rationality in Extensive-Form Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4029828 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip J Reny (0000-0002-8903-8675, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada., corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 103-118 |
| Publication date | 1992-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.6.4.103 |
| OpenAlex | W2062567558 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 6 |
Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate
Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Rationality · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Philosophy
Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
Subjunctive Conditionals and Revealed Preference
Bayesian Subjunctive Conditionals for Games and Decisions
Classical and team reasoning in the Centipede Game
The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building
Cooperation in repeated interactions
Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality
| Citations per year | 0.29 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1998 - 2024 (27) |
| Highly cited | No |