Rethinking Cancellation

Less Than Judgemental, More Than Neutral

Bibliographic Data

ID20143058
AuthorsFaraz Ghalbi (0000-0003-2231-5591, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), School of Philosophy Tehran Iran, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume92
Issue1
Publication date2026-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.70063
OpenAlexW7117475515
LanguageEN
References cited54

Peter Hanks challenges the idea of neutral predication, considering predication as an act with judgemental force. This perspective leads him to reject the distinction between propositional content and force. However, by denying this distinction, Hanks encounters the Frege‐Geach problem and proposes a cancellation mechanism to address it. A crucial question about this mechanism is what happens when a judgemental predication is cancelled. Indrek Reiland presents Hanks with a dilemma: either cancelled predication indicates the absence of predication, or it implies neutral predication, both of which are unsatisfactory. As a result, Reiland argues that Hanks's cancellation mechanism is flawed. To address this, François Recanati suggests interpreting cancelled predication as having some degree of force but lacking judgemental force. However, I argue that even this revised interpretation has limitations. In particular, a careful examination of Hanks's argument against neutral predication reveals that it similarly applies to this revised interpretation of cancelled predication

Argument (complex analysis) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Mechanism (biology) · Perspective (graphical) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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