Understanding force cancellation

Bibliographic Data

ID21335655
AuthorsFrançois Recanati (0000-0002-8642-2954, Collège de France, Paris, France, corresponding author)
Year2022
Pages1-19
Publication date2022-05-21
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2022.2075920
OpenAlexW4281260550
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited24

To address the Frege-Geach objection, proponents of the ‘forceful’ version of the act-theoretic approach to propositions appeal to the idea of force cancellation. How is that idea to be understood? In this paper, three models of force cancellation are discussed (and their shortcomings pointed out): the mereological model, the Brentanian model, and the – intermediate – transmutation model. Extant versions of these models are meant to account for force cancellation in speech, but they do not easily extend to force cancellation in thought. To overcome that limitation, a psychologistic version of the transmutation model is put forward, based on ‘simulation theory’

Appeal · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Extant taxon · Political science · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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