Simulating Minds
The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23389296 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alvin I Goldman (0000-0003-0793-4589, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Publication date | 2006-08-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Simulating Minds (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4248926310 |
| ISBN | 9780195138924 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 319 |
| References cited | 423 |
How people assign mental states to others and how they represent or conceptualize such states in the first place are topics of interest to philosophy of mind, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. Three competing answers to the question of how people impute mental states to others have been offered: by rationalizing, by theorizing, or by simulating. Simulation theory says that mindreaders produce mental states in their own minds that resemble, or aim to resemble, those of their targets; these states are then imputed to, or projected onto, the targets. In low-level mindreading, such as reading emotions from faces, simulation is mediated by automatic mirror systems. More controlled processes of simulation, here called “enactment imagination”, are used in high-level mindreading. Just as visual and motor imagery are attempts to replicate acts of seeing and doing, mindreading is characteristically an attempt to replicate the mental processes of a target, followed by projection of the imagination-generated state onto the target. Projection errors are symptomatic of simulation, because one’s own genuine states readily intrude into the simulational process. A nuanced form of introspection is introduced to explain self-attribution and also to address the question of how mental concepts are represented. A distinctive cognitive code involving introspective representations figures prominently in our concepts of mental states. The book concludes with an overview of the pervasive effects on social life of simulation, imitation, and empathy, and charts their possible roles in moral experience and the fictive arts.
Attribution · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Empathy · Imitation · Introspection · Mental image · Mental representation · Simulated reality · Social cognition · Social intelligence · Theory of mind · Action Observation and Synchronization · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Face Recognition and Perception · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
The social genesis of machine intelligence
Moved by Music Alone
Interpreting Dilthey
Cognitive Science
Imagination and Simulation in Audience Responses to Fiction
Pragmatic Mental Imagery
Vicarious Perception
Pragmatic Representations
Perception
Action
Dilthey’s Defense of Historicism
An integrated theory of language production and comprehension
Enactive intersubjectivity
Episodic Simulation of Future Events
How we know our own minds
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social Identification
The cultural evolution of mind reading
Mammalian empathy
Thinking is Believing
The Social Neuroscience of Empathy
Mindreading in Infancy
Empathy and Direct Social Perception
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons
A taxonomy of prospection
The conclusion of practical reasoning
Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge
Visuospatial and Affective Perspective-Taking
The practice of explaining
Talk about Pop Muzik
Between Perception and Action
A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy
Graded Empathy
What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition
Grounded Cognition
The evolution of hierarchically structured communication
Can I Feel Your Pain? The Biological and Socio-Cognitive Factors Shaping People’s Empathy with Social Robots
Understanding What It's Like To Be (Dis)Privileged
Against Cognitivism About Supposition
The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy
Understanding Another Person's Emotions—An Interdisciplinary Research Approach
Social Cognition
Online Construction of Multimodal Metaphors In Murnau’s Movie Faust (1926)
Introspection Without Judgment
The Relation Between Empathy and Insight in Psychiatric Disorders
What is it (like) to imagine an emotion
Preference‐Based Representations for Collective Agency
Cocka-tooling around
On the role of verbal semantics in question embedding
El caso perdue
La perspectiva de la segunda persona
Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Gegenwart der Empathie
Knowing qualia
The Science of Emotion
The Cognitive Philosophy of Communication
The Self-Knowledge of Combinatory States
Empathy through Listening
Raising the Buddha’s Hand
Understanding A.I. — Can and Should we Empathize with Robots
Predicting the Past from Minimal Traces
Narrative Scaffolding
Representing the Mind as Such in Infancy
Autistic Masking, Neurotypical Mindshaping, and Self-understanding
Partial First-Person Authority
An Externalist Theory of Social Understanding
Lyric Poetry and the Disorientation of Empathy
Caring as the Default of Empathic Direct Perception
Fictional Characters in Literary Theory — A Short History
Shaping your own mind
Misidentification delusions as mentalization disorders
Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central
Towards a phenomenological account of social sensitivity
Emotional abilities and art experience in autism spectrum disorder
You walk into a tavern
Genuine empathy with inanimate objects
Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology
‘What it is like to be me’
‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction
Why severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand
Simulating experiences
‘I am in pain’
Empathy and Common Ground
Can’t stop
Visual perspective and body ownership modulate vicarious pain and touch
Five steps to understand the mental state
Can Sitting Postures Influence the Creative Mind? Positive Effect of Contractive Posture on Convergent-Integrative Thinking
Imagination, Desire, and Irrationality
Emotional Gaslighting and Affective Empathy
Neurorights versus Externalism about Mental Content
Intention and empathy
Virtually imagining our biases
Capacity for simulation and mitigation drives hedonic and non-hedonic time biases
Reality testing and metacognition
Self-knowledge in joint acceptance accounts
Embodied simulation and knowledge of possibilities
Bodily expressions as gestalts. An argument for grounding direct perception theories
Emotions and two senses of simulation
All simulation is structural
Varieties of memory, varieties of reconstruction, varieties of memory trace
Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege
The Philosophy of Psychology
Sentence Comprehension
Children Talk About The Mind
Sentimental Rules
Empathy and Moral Development
Image and Mind
The Robot's Rebellion
How Children Learn the Meanings of Words
Moral Thinking
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
The Child's Theory of Mind
The Significance of Consciousness
Recreative Minds
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Ruling Passions
Being Known
Beyond Aesthetics
Both of Us Disgusted in My Insula
Why the Child's Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory
Ontological categories guide young children's inductions of word meaning
The manifold nature of interpersonal relations
Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components of Pain
How do you feel? Interoception
Theory of mind and rule-based reasoning
Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading
Biosemantics
Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task
Flocks, herds and schools
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
The emulation theory of representation
An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
Perception and Action Planning
The Fusiform Face Area
Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control and Children's Theory of Mind
A perspective on disgust.
Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation
Limits on theory of mind use in adults
Unconscious Facial Reactions to Emotional Facial Expressions
Pretending and believing
Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see
A cognitive theory of pretense
Three‐year‐olds' difficulty with false belief
How do we perceive the pain of others? A window into the neural processes involved in empathy
Perceiving persons and groups.
Is vision continuous with cognition?
Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions
Goal attribution without agency cues
Recognition-by-components
Motor facilitation during action observation
Mental Rotation of Three-Dimensional Objects
Computational approaches to motor control
The Significance of Posture in Communication Systems †
Representing others' actions
Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age
Parietal Lobe
Multiple paired forward and inverse models for motor control
Grasping the Intentions of Others with One's Own Mirror Neuron System
Influence and Involvement in Children's Discourse
Exaptation—a Missing Term in the Science of Form
A unifying view of the basis of social cognition
Sound Film Analysis of Normal and Pathological Behavior Patterns
Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind
An Experimental Study of Imagination
An Internal Model for Sensorimotor Integration
Die „Autistischen Psychopathen” im Kindesalter
A Theory of Causal Learning in Children
Predicting Hunger
Perceptual causality and animacy
Impaired recognition of emotion in facial expressions following bilateral damage to the human amygdala
Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis
Theory of mind development and social understanding
Empathy
Teleological reasoning in infancy
Recognizing Emotion from Facial Expressions
Computational principles of movement neuroscience
What Mary Didn't Know
Change blindness
How we know our minds
Newborn Infants Imitate Adult Facial Gestures
Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action
Action recognition in the premotor cortex
Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?
Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?
Judgment under uncertainty
Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates
Autonomic Nervous System Activity Distinguishes Among Emotions
Hearing Sounds, Understanding Actions
Neural Simulation of Action
Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor's reach
Finding the Self? An Event-Related fMRI Study
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development
Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’
Are there basic emotions?
Social Projection of Transient Drive States
People thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
Development of the appearance-reality distinction
Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action
| Unique citing works | 319 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 15,95 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 318 |