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Partial First-Person Authority

How We Know Our Own Emotions

Bibliographic Data

ID21822985
AuthorsAdam J Andreotta (0000-0003-1458-2657, Curtin University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume15
Issue4
Pages1375-1397
Publication date2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReview of Philosophy and Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1878-5158 • E-ISSN: 1878-5166
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s13164-023-00698-6
OpenAlexW4387781968
LanguageEN
References cited35

This paper focuses on the self-knowledge of emotions. I first argue that several of the leading theories of self-knowledge, including the transparency method (see, e.g., Byrne 2018) and neo-expressivism (see, e.g., Bar-On 2004), have difficulties explaining how we authoritatively know our own emotions (even though they may plausibly account for sensation, belief, intention, and desire). I next consider Barrett’s (2017a) empirically informed theory of constructed emotion . While I agree with her that we ‘give meaning to [our] present sensations’ (2017a, p.26), I disagree with her that we construct our emotions, as this has some unwelcome implications. I then draw upon recent data from the science of emotions literature to advance a view I call partial first-person authority. According to this view, first-person authority with respect to our emotions is only partial: we can introspect and authoritatively know our own sensations, and beliefs, in ways others cannot; but we still need to interpret those sensations and beliefs, to know our emotions. Finally, I consider self-interpretational accounts of self-knowledge by Carruthers (2011) and Cassam (2014). I argue that while these accounts are implausible when applied to beliefs, desires, and intentions, they are more plausible when applied to our emotions

Epistemology · Expressivism · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Self-knowledge · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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