Partial First-Person Authority
How We Know Our Own Emotions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21822985 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adam J Andreotta (0000-0003-1458-2657, Curtin University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1375-1397 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Philosophy and Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1878-5158 • E-ISSN: 1878-5166 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s13164-023-00698-6 |
| OpenAlex | W4387781968 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 35 |
This paper focuses on the self-knowledge of emotions. I first argue that several of the leading theories of self-knowledge, including the transparency method (see, e.g., Byrne 2018) and neo-expressivism (see, e.g., Bar-On 2004), have difficulties explaining how we authoritatively know our own emotions (even though they may plausibly account for sensation, belief, intention, and desire). I next consider Barrett’s (2017a) empirically informed theory of constructed emotion . While I agree with her that we ‘give meaning to [our] present sensations’ (2017a, p.26), I disagree with her that we construct our emotions, as this has some unwelcome implications. I then draw upon recent data from the science of emotions literature to advance a view I call partial first-person authority. According to this view, first-person authority with respect to our emotions is only partial: we can introspect and authoritatively know our own sensations, and beliefs, in ways others cannot; but we still need to interpret those sensations and beliefs, to know our emotions. Finally, I consider self-interpretational accounts of self-knowledge by Carruthers (2011) and Cassam (2014). I argue that while these accounts are implausible when applied to beliefs, desires, and intentions, they are more plausible when applied to our emotions
Epistemology · Expressivism · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Self-knowledge · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
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Mindreading
Simulating Minds
Emotions
Bodily maps of emotions
Introspection
The theory of constructed emotion
Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state.
Consciousness and Experience
Introspection of Emotions
Speaking My Mind
Authority and Estrangement
Perceptions of emotion from facial expressions are not culturally universal
Repressors' Appraisals of Emotional Stimuli in Threatening and Nonthreatening Positive Emotional Contexts
Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Some evidence for heightened sexual attraction under conditions of high anxiety
Upheavals of Thought
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |