A defence of conceptual analysis as a linguistic endeavour
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143243 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jumbly Grindrod (0000-0001-8684-974X, Philosophy Department University of Reading Reading UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 516-534 |
| Publication date | 2023-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12477 |
| OpenAlex | W4378714337 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 26 |
In this paper, I outline and defend a traditional yet controversial view of conceptual analysis, particularly as it is used in epistemology. I will defend the view against a number of objections, all of which focus on the idea that conceptual analysis relies upon linguistic intuitions. Rather than trying to deny this claim, I will seek to vindicate the use of conceptual analysis within epistemology even given its reliance on linguistic intuitions. To do so, I first outline the view of conceptual analysis I have in mind and then respond to three broad objections from Quill Kukla, Allan Hazlett and Stephen Stich
Conceptual framework · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Linguistic analysis · Linguistic turn · Linguistics · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Knowledge and its Limits
Philosophy without Intuitions
The Philosophy of Philosophy
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
Radical moral encroachment
Delimiting the Proper Scope of Epistemology
Reflective equilibrium, analytic epistemology and the problem of cognitive diversity
Knowing the Answer
The Myth of Factive Verbs
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |