A Relational Response to N ewman's Objection to R ussell's Causal Theory of Perception

Bibliographic Data

ID20143297
AuthorsNaomi Eilan (University of Warwick, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume81
Issue1
Pages4-26
Publication date2015-02-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12037
OpenAlexW2146128961
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited22

The causal theory of perception ( CTP ) has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. N ewman's set‐theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of the CTP , in his 1928 paper “ M r R ussell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should: N ewman's objection can be generalized to yield a particularly powerful and incisive challenge to all versions of the CTP . In effect it says that if the CTP is true, at least one of the following claims must be false. (1) Our perception‐based judgements are made true or false by the state of mind independent objects. (2) The concepts we use in such judgments refer to the intrinsic, mind‐independent properties of such objects. (3) Experience provides us with knowledge of these properties. The paper sets out the structure of the problem as N ewman saw it, extends it to current debates in theory of perception and considers various responses to it. The response I argue for involves jettisoning the CTP in favour of a relational account of perceptual experience, in a way that allows us to hold onto all three claims

Epistemology · Perception · Scrutiny · Set (abstract data type) · Theology · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology · Social Psychology

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