Naomi Eilan
Biographic Data
| ID | 5898032 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Naomi Eilan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Naomi |
| FAMILY NAME | Eilan |
| SIGNATURE | EILAN N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 3 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Other I’s, communication, and the second person
Why do we think there are other self-conscious about, other thinkers of ‘I’ thoughts, other possessors of a first-person perspective? What is the most basic manifestation of our grip on their existence? This paper develops an answer to these questions summarised under the heading: Second Person Communication Claim (SPCC), which says: Our grip on the idea that other self-conscious subjects exist is rooted in our capacity to enter into particular k…
Intersubjective exchanges
Richard Moran’s “social-relational” account of illocutionary acts such as telling takes off from, and develops, a particularly powerful version of Reid’s notion of “social acts of mind”. On his version, the other’s contribution, or uptake, is essential to making such acts the acts of mind they are. The questions I pursue are the following. (1) What does this social dependence amount to in Moran’s account? What does it take, on his account, for an…
A Relational Response to N ewman's Objection to R ussell's Causal Theory of Perception
The causal theory of perception ( CTP ) has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. N ewman's set‐theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of the CTP , in his 1928 paper “ M r R ussell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should: N ewman's objection can be generalized to y…
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity
"To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness,…
Agency and self-awareness
Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought
Molyneux’s question and the idea of an external world
The basic format of Molyneux’s question can be and has been extended to spatial properties other than shape, such as location, length and so forth; and to modalities other than vision and touch, such as hearing and proprioception, and to action. Very loosely, negative answers to the question are said to involve the idea that spatial perceptions are modality-specific; positive answers, the idea that they are a modal. Its enduring interest lies in …
Spatial representation
The Body and the Self
The Social Body
The Body and the Self
The Social Body
The Body and the Self
The Body and the Self
Molyneux’s question and the idea of an external world
The basic format of Molyneux’s question can be and has been extended to spatial properties other than shape, such as location, length and so forth; and to modalities other than vision and touch, such as hearing and proprioception, and to action. Very loosely, negative answers to the question are said to involve the idea that spatial perceptions are modality-specific; positive answers, the idea that they are a modal. Its enduring interest lies in …
Spatial representation
Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought
Agency and self-awareness
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity
"To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness,…
A Relational Response to N ewman's Objection to R ussell's Causal Theory of Perception
The causal theory of perception ( CTP ) has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. N ewman's set‐theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of the CTP , in his 1928 paper “ M r R ussell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should: N ewman's objection can be generalized to y…
Intersubjective exchanges
Richard Moran’s “social-relational” account of illocutionary acts such as telling takes off from, and develops, a particularly powerful version of Reid’s notion of “social acts of mind”. On his version, the other’s contribution, or uptake, is essential to making such acts the acts of mind they are. The questions I pursue are the following. (1) What does this social dependence amount to in Moran’s account? What does it take, on his account, for an…
Other I’s, communication, and the second person
Why do we think there are other self-conscious about, other thinkers of ‘I’ thoughts, other possessors of a first-person perspective? What is the most basic manifestation of our grip on their existence? This paper develops an answer to these questions summarised under the heading: Second Person Communication Claim (SPCC), which says: Our grip on the idea that other self-conscious subjects exist is rooted in our capacity to enter into particular k…
Psychology (10 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (3 works)