Unger's Argument for Skepticism Revisited
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143386 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Igor Douven (0000-0003-3413-080X, KU Leuven), DIEDERIK OLDERS (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 239-250 |
| Publication date | 2008-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00020.x |
| OpenAlex | W1833180346 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 18 |
Unger (1974/2000 ) presents an argument for skepticism that significantly differs from the more traditional arguments for skepticism. The argument is based on two premises, to wit, that knowledge would entitle the knower to absolute certainty, and that an attitude of absolute certainty is always inadmissible from an epistemic viewpoint. The present paper scrutinizes the arguments that Unger provides in support of these premises and shows that none of them is tenable. It thus concludes that Unger's argument for skepticism fails to threaten the possibility of knowledge
Absolute (philosophy) · Argument (complex analysis) · Certainty · Epistemology · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The structure of empirical knowledge
The coherence theory of truth.
Concepts of Epistemic Justification
Conditionalization and observation
Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent
Epistemic Possibilities
A Defense of Skepticism
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox
Conditionalizing on Knowledge
Epistemology and cognition
Ignorance
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |