Conditionalizing on Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8398302 |
|---|---|
| Authors | T Williamson (0000-0002-4659-8672, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-121 |
| Publication date | 1998-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/49.1.89 |
| OpenAlex | W2057239768 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 34 |
A theory of evidential probability is developed from two assumptions:(1) the evidential probability of a proposition is its probability conditional on the total evidence;(2) one's total evidence is one's total knowledge. Evidential probability is distinguished from both subjective and objective probability. Loss as well as gain of evidence is permitted. Evidential probability is embedded within epistemic logic by means of possible worlds semantics for modal logic; this allows a natural theory of higher-order probability to be developed. In particular, it is emphasized that it is sometimes uncertain which propositions are part of one's total evidence; some surprising implications of this fact are drawn out.
Bayesian probability · Conditional probability · Decision analysis · Decision theory · Description logic · Epistemic modal logic · Epistemology · Evidential decision theory · Evidential reasoning approach · Imprecise probability · Law of total probability · Mathematical economics · Modal · Modal logic · Multimodal logic · Possible world · Posterior probability · Probability theory · Proposition · Semantics (computer science) · Statistics · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
A Moral Theory of Liveliness
Scepticism and Evidence
On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals
Knowledge and its Limits
Liveliness as a Theory of Meaning in Life
Junk, Numerosity, and the Demands of Epistemic Consequentialism
Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first
Unger's Argument for Skepticism Revisited
Liveliness as Secular Life Force
Conclusion
Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
On background
Ought-contextualism and reasoning
Belief without credence
Epistemic repugnance four ways
The Stability Theory of Belief
Confirmation in a Branching World
Open-Minded Orthodox Bayesianism by Epsilon-Conditionalization
A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
Agreeing to Disagree
Belief and the Will
Updating Subjective Probability
Vagueness
Some Epistemic Capacities
Reflections on reflection
Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology
A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization
Subjective and Objective Confirmation
Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics
Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
Knowing and Asserting
Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
Change in View
Probability Kinematics
| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,77 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2025 (26) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |