Subjective and Objective Confirmation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10705282 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Patrick Maher (0000-0001-5059-1062, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 149-174 |
| Publication date | 1996-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/289906 |
| OpenAlex | W2018785753 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 22 |
Confirmation is commonly identified with positive relevance, E being said to confirm H if and only if E increases the probability of H . Today, analyses of this general kind are usually Bayesian ones that take the relevant probabilities to be subjective. I argue that these subjective Bayesian analyses are irremediably flawed. In their place I propose a relevance analysis that makes confirmation objective and which, I show, avoids the flaws of the subjective analyses. What I am proposing is in some ways a return to Carnap's conception of confirmation, though there are also important differences between my analysis and his. My analysis includes new accounts of what evidence is and of the indexicality of confirmation claims. Finally, I defend my analysis against Achinstein's criticisms of the relevance concept of confirmation
Bayesian probability · Epistemology · Indexicality · Political science · Relevance (law) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Knowledge and its Limits
Tracking Truth
Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support
Wright, Okasha and Chandler on transmission failure
Discussion Note
Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief
Swimming in Evidence
The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view
Formal schemas of induction as models
A causal theory of confirmation for Bayesians
Evidence and armchair access
Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle
Confirmation measures and collaborative belief updating
The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation
Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox
Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science
Conditionalizing on Knowledge
The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence
Is Evidence Non-Inferential
The continuum of inductive methods.
Betting on Theories
Scorekeeping in a language game
Aspects of Scientific Explanation
I.—studies in the Logic of Confirmation (Ii.)
Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Bayesianism and Support by Novel Facts
Some Recent Objections to the Bayesian Theory of Support
The ‘Old Evidence’ Problem
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Probability and evidence
| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,77 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2024 (29) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 23 |