Updating Subjective Probability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23344798 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Persi Diaconis (0000-0003-0837-6662, Stanford University), Sandy L Zabell |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 380 |
| Pages | 822-830 |
| Publication date | 1982-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the American Statistical Association (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0162-1459 • E-ISSN: 1537-274X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01621459.1982.10477893 |
| OpenAlex | W1991884749 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 65 |
| References cited | 31 |
Jeffrey's rule for revising a probability P to a new probability P* based on new probabilities P* (Ei ) on a partition {Ei } i = 1 n is P*(A) = Σ P(A| Ei ) P* (Ei ). Jeffrey's rule is applicable if it is judged that P* (A | Ei ) = P(A | Ei ) for all A and i. This article discusses some of the mathematical properties of this rule, connecting it with sufficient partitions, and maximum entropy updating of contingency tables. The main results concern simultaneous revision on two partitions.
Bayesian probability · Chain rule (probability) · Combinatorics · Contingency table · Discrete mathematics · Entropy (arrow of time) · Law of total probability · Partition (number theory) · Posterior probability · Statistics · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Data Management and Algorithms · Mathematics · Rough Sets and Fuzzy Logic
On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1
Becker's thesis and three models of preference change
Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism
On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle
Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning
Old Evidence and New Explanation
Probability Kinematics and Commutativity
Counterfactual Thinking and the First Instinct Fallacy
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Hypothesis evaluation from a Bayesian perspective.
Belief revision generalized
Alias Smith and Jones
A Further Look at the Bayes Blind Spot
Radical Pooling and Imprecise Probabilities
Superconditioning
Learning from experience and conditionalization
A note on deterministic updating and van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for conditionalization
Remarks on staffel on full belief
Time-slice epistemology for Bayesians
Conditionals and testimony
Nonexpected utility as aversion of information
Updating as Communication
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization
Research Policy and Review 34
Probability logic, logical probability, and inductive support
Simultaneous belief updates via successive Jeffrey conditionalization
Bayesian defeat of certainties
Conditional learning through causal models
Expert deference as a belief revision schema
Bayesian coherentism
A Logic For Inductive Probabilistic Reasoning
Logical ignorance and logical learning
Indifference, neutrality and informativeness
Maximum entropy inference as a special case of conditionalization
The value of cost-free uncertain evidence
Rational factionalization for agents with probabilistically related beliefs
The kinematics of belief and desire
The principle of maximum entropy and a problem in probability kinematics
How much are bold Bayesians favoured
Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot
On the proper formulation of conditionalization
Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree
Sets of probability distributions, independence, and convexity
Explicating formal epistemology
Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence
Postscript to Richard Jeffrey’s “Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability”
Why Bayesian Psychology Is Incomplete
Radical Probabilism Revisited
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II
Wisdom Updated
Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics
On Indeterminate Updating of Credences
Old Evidence and New Explanation III
Epistemology Formalized
Conditionalizing on Knowledge
Rational Aversion to Information
Open-Minded Orthodox Bayesianism by Epsilon-Conditionalization
Theories of Probability
On the Ecological and Internal Rationality of Bayesian Conditionalization and Other Belief Updating Strategies
Updating Probability
Bayesian Conditionalization and Probability Kinematics
Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind
Bayesianism I
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence
A Treatise on Probability
I knew it would happen
Hindsight is not equal to foresight
Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics
Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
Jeffrey's Rule of Conditioning
A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization
Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability
Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics
Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions
Bayesian Conditionalisation and the Principle of Minimum Information
Probability Kinematics
Corroboration, Explanation, Evolving Probability, Simplicity and a Sharpened Razor
| Unique citing works | 65 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,51 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2026 (44) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 56 |