Pain Begins

Bibliographic Data

ID20143406
AuthorsAviv Spector Shirtz (0000-0002-5827-1538, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem Israel, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume88
Issue4
Pages765-781
Publication date2022-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12391
OpenAlexW4213209664
LanguageEN
References cited24

This paper advances a non‐process–oriented understanding of the mind–body relation by uncovering constraints on physicalist mind–body theories. The method of this paper is to explore possible answers that different mind–body theories can provide to the question “When does an experience of pain begin?” This paper demonstrates that physicalist mind–body theories must postulate a synchronic relation between a temporally invariant (i.e., constant over time, as opposed to changing over time) aspect of the mental and a temporally invariant aspect of the physical. This conclusion poses a challenge to many popular mind–body theories, especially those that postulate a synchronic realisation relation between physical processes and instantiations of mental kinds, such as Functionalism, and in particular Computationalism. Apart from the implications on theory choice and theory design within the philosophy of mind, this paper presents a useful tool for the evaluation of inter‐level relations

Cognitive science · Computational theory of mind · Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Metaphysics · Mind–body problem · Philosophy of mind · Physicalism · Realisation · Relation (database) · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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