A Bootstrap Theory of Rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143480 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonas Nilsson (0000-0001-6667-9149, Umeå University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 182-199 |
| Publication date | 2008-02-11 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2005.tb01012.x |
| OpenAlex | W2011877607 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
In this paper a bootstrap theory of rationality is presented. Such a theory is an attempt to explain how standards of rational inquiry may be rationally revised — without assuming that there are any basic and fixed standards for evaluating such revisions. The general bootstrap idea is briefly presented in the first sections. The main part of the paper consists of a discussion of what normative requirements a bootstrap theory should contain, and a number of requirements on rational revisions are proposed. The final section deals with the question of whether a bootstrap theory is self-referentially coherent
Econometrics · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Normative · Rationality · Section (typography) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Pain Management and Placebo Effect · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|