Prudence, Commitments and Intertemporal Conflicts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143576 |
|---|---|
| Authors | VAUGHN HUCKFELDT (University of South Dakota, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 42-54 |
| Publication date | 2011-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01084.x |
| OpenAlex | W1843367972 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 16 |
Typical justifications of prudence are based on the fact that we are temporally extended agents who remain numerically identical over time. After showing that prudential considerations should instead be based on our identity at a particular time, I outline a normative context for prudential reasons, based on a present commitment to temporal neutrality. I then consider how contingency in the content of a present commitment to temporal neutrality provides a flexible context that can help to resolve current debates about whether agents are required to maximize value, maximin value, minimax loss or are required to conform to any of a host of other options on how to adjudicate various types of conflict between present and future values
Adjudication · Context (archaeology) · Contingency · Discretion · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Minimax · Neutrality · Normative · Political science · Positive economics · Prudence · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |