Prudence for Changing Selves

Bibliographic Data

ID8077157
AuthorsKrister Bykvist (0000-0003-4370-7201, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume18
Issue3
Pages264-283
Publication date2006-08-21
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueUtilitas (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0953820806002032
OpenAlexW2093945771
LanguageEN
Citations received16

What is the prudentially right thing to do in situations in which our actions will shape our preferences? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. This is the problem I will deal with in this article. I will begin by explaining why preferences matter to prudence. I will then go on to discuss a couple of unsuccessful theories and see what we can learn from their mistakes. One of the most important lessons is that how you would have felt about a life had you never led it is irrelevant to the question of what you prudentially ought to do. My theory takes this into account. What counts is how you feel about a life when you are actually leading it

Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Positive economics · Prudence · Sociology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Philosophy · Social Psychology

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