Counterpart Theory and the Argument from Modal Concerns
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143591 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Steffen Borges (0000-0002-8263-1476, Syracuse University, corresponding author), Steffen Borge |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 269-285 |
| Publication date | 2006-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2006.tb00965.x |
| OpenAlex | W1972725782 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
Kripke complained that counterpart theory makes modal claims be about counterparts and not about us, and that it is a misguided model of modality since we do not care about counterparts in the same way we care about ourselves. The first part of the complaint, I argue, has been met by Hazen and Lewis, while the second can be countered by observing that most of our modal concerns are about role‐fillers and that counterparts are well‐suited to such concerns. The role‐filler analysis of modal concerns, however, does not seem to capture certain attitudes ‐ especially that of regret. Regret, however, I will argue, is not intrinsically modal and thus is no challenge to my general analysis of modal concerns
Argument (complex analysis) · Complaint · Epistemology · Modal · Modality (human–computer interaction) · Political science · Regret · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Historical and Scientific Studies · Law · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2012 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |