Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Does regulatory enforcement improve continuing disclosure? The municipal securities market case of the Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation (MCDC) initiative

Bibliographic Data

ID20201525
AuthorsYulianti Abbas (0000-0002-7941-8447, University of Indonesia), Craig L Johnson (0000-0001-7401-3507, Indiana University Bloomington)
Year2022
Volume34
Issue2
Pages257-291
Publication date2022-03-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Public Budgeting Accounting & Financial Management (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1096-3367 • E-ISSN: 1945-1814
PublisherEmerald (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1108/jpbafm-03-2021-0041
OpenAlexW3194620928
LanguageEN
References cited36

Purpose This paper analyzes the impact of increased federal regulatory enforcement from the SEC's Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation (MCDC) initiative on municipal debt issuers continuing disclosure practices. Design/methodology/approach We analyze the changes in continuing disclosure practices by estimating a series of difference-in-differences regressions based on variables representing issuers' changes in regulatory risk after the MCDC. The continuing disclosure data are hand-collected for 827 cities over a seven-year period. Findings The empirical findings indicate that increased regulatory enforcement has a significant impact on continuing disclosure compliance. We find increased enforcement has no impact on issuers that already have a higher probability of being monitored by federal regulators. We also find that an increase in continuing disclosure compliance does not automatically increase continuing disclosure timeliness. Practical implications The MCDC lacks monetary penalties for noncompliant bond issuers and no direct regulatory consequences exist for untimely disclosure. Our findings suggest that regulatory enforcement should be followed by adequate sanctions to emphasize the credibility of the enforcement threat and the SEC should consider requiring bond issuers to commit to the timely disclosure of significant information in offering documents. Originality/value This paper extends prior studies by analyzing regulatory risk in the market, and the ability of regulation to reduce disclosure compliance deficiencies in the municipal market. By focusing on the MCDC, this study is able to disentangle the impact of regulatory enforcement from the changes in accounting regulation

Business · Credibility · Enforcement · Issuer · Political science · Sanctions · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Accounting · Finance

  • Discretionary disclosure

    Open Access•Robert E Verrecchia•Journal of Accounting and Economics•1983

  • Gaining Regulatory Compliance

    Open Access•Nancy Frank, Michael Lombness•Administration & Society•1988

  • The Optimum Enforcement of Laws

    George J Stigler•Journal of Political Economy•1970

  • A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement

    Paul Fenn, Cento Veljanovski et al.•The Economic Journal•1988

  • "The Market for "Lemons

    George A Akerlof•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1970

  • The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on Municipal Bond Interest Rates

    Open Access•Bill Simonsen, Mark D Robbins et al.•Public Administration Review•2001

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOI
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae