Rules or capacity for the EU’s fiscal future? From Werner and McDougall to the present
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20201788 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christakis Georgiou (0000-0001-9093-885X, University of Geneva, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 200-216 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Budgeting Accounting & Financial Management (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1096-3367 • E-ISSN: 1945-1814 |
| Publisher | Emerald (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1108/jpbafm-08-2023-0151 |
| OpenAlex | W4389737625 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 30 |
Purpose The COVID19 crisis has thrown wide open the debate on Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’s (EMU) future. Next Generation EU (NGEU) has broken the stalemate over a central fiscal capacity. The open question is whether NGEU is a one-off or a first step. The suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact has given new urgency to the debate on reforming EMU’s fiscal rules. Design/methodology/approach There is no debate as yet about how these two prospects relate to each other. This paper argues that a permanent fiscal capacity and revised rules should be seen as alternatives. Findings This study makes two claims: first, a fiscal capacity renders a reformed pact unnecessary and second, that is an optimal solution politically. A fiscal capacity would provide an efficient asymmetric shock absorber and therefore reduce the need for pre-emptive action against negative cross-border externalities. It would also provide an abundant supply of an EU-wide safe asset around which to structure the EU’s financial system, thus rendering unnecessary the backstopping of member states' debts. Originality/value This would restore democratic accountability while eliminating moral hazard and enforcement problems
Democracy · Economic policy · Economics · Enforcement · European integration · European union · Fiscal policy · Fiscal union · Incentive · International economics · Law and economics · Maastricht Treaty · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Member states · Moral hazard · Political science · Politics · Stability and Growth Pact · European Union Policy and Governance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |