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Do Formulas Reduce Political Influence on Intergovernmental Grants? Evidence from Tanzania

Bibliographic Data

ID20301280
AuthorsMaarten Allers (0000-0002-6838-9046, University of Groningen, corresponding author), Maarten A Allers, Lewis J Ishemoi (0009-0001-2350-8953, Institute of Finance Management)
Year2011
Volume47
Issue12
Pages1781-1797
Publication date2011-12-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Development Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0388 • E-ISSN: 1743-9140
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00220388.2011.598512
OpenAlexW1987315231
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited9

Sub-national governments usually depend on the central government for a large share of their revenues. Therefore, a fair allocation of intergovernmental grants is essential for financing vital local services like education and healthcare. In Tanzania, and many other countries, regions that are better represented in the national parliament receive significantly more funds than others. Recently, Tanzania replaced the previously existing discretionary method of grant allocation by allocation formulas. We study whether this has reduced the effect of malapportionment on grant allocation. Surprisingly, we find that formula allocation does not significantly change this effect. This has important policy implications

Business · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Revenue · Socioeconomics · Tanzania · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration

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Citations per year0.47
Citation span2011 - 2026 (16)
Highly citedNo

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