Taxes and Bribes in Uganda

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20302575
AutoresPamela Jagger (0000-0001-7148-432X, Department of Public Policy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA, autor correspondente), Gerald Shively (0000-0002-0460-0762, Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA and School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway)
Ano2015
Volume51
Fascículo1
Páginas66-79
Data de publicação2015-01-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Journal of Development Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0388 • E-ISSN: 1743-9140
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00220388.2014.947278
PMID27274568
OpenAlexW1971603270
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas35

Using data from 433 firms operating along Uganda's charcoal and timber supply chains we investigate patterns of bribe payment and tax collection between supply chain actors and government officials responsible for collecting taxes and fees. We examine the factors associated with the presence and magnitude of bribe and tax payments using a series of bivariate probit and Tobit regression models. We find empirical support for a number of hypotheses related to payments, highlighting the role of queuing, capital-at-risk, favouritism, networks, and role in the supply chain. We also find that taxes crowd-in bribery in the charcoal market

Bivariate analysis · Business · Econometrics · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Labour economics · Logit · Monetary economics · Multivariate probit model · Payment · Probit · Probit model · Public economics · Tobit model · Transferability · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Growth and Development · Finance · Taxation and Compliance Studies