Richard Swinburne's argument to the simplicity of God via the infinite
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20310253 |
|---|---|
| Authors | JEREMY GWIAZDA (The Graduate Center, CUNY, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 487-493 |
| Publication date | 2009-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412509990217 |
| OpenAlex | W2079712420 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 3 |
In The Coherence of Theism Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In The Existence of God Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne's argument in The Existence of God (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne's argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Existence of God · Simplicity · Theism · Theology · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 0.18 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2009 - 2018 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |