A response to Oppy, and to Davey and Clifton
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20311661 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard M Gale (University of Pittsburgh), Alexander R Pru (0000-0002-0069-532X, Georgetown University), Alexander R Pruss |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-99 |
| Publication date | 2002-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412501005923 |
| OpenAlex | W2140312511 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Our paper ‘A new cosmological argument’ gave an argument for the existence of God making use of the weak Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR) which states that for every proposition p , if p is true, then it is possible that there is an explanation for p . Recently, Graham Oppy, as well as Kevin Davey and Rob Clifton, have criticized the argument. We reply to these criticisms. The most interesting kind of criticism in both papers alleges that the W-PSR can be justifiably denied by the atheist, and constitutes no improvement on the strong Principle of Sufficient Reason (S-PSR) which claims that every true proposition in fact has an explanation. The criticism is predicated on the fact that it can be shown that the W-PSR entails the S-PSR. We argue that the W-PSR's plausibility remains despite the criticisms. From this it can be seen to follow that the entailment relation between the W-PSR and the S-PSR gives one reason to believe the S-PSR
Argument (complex analysis) · Criticism · Epistemology · Logical consequence · Political science · Proposition · Relation (database) · Computer Science · Law · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2013 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |