Deontology, Paradox, and Moral Evil
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20316847 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Brook (0000-0003-4215-3091), R J Brook (0000-0002-1811-663X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 431-440 |
| Publication date | 2007-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Theory and Practice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0037-802X • E-ISSN: 2154-123X |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/soctheorpract200733316 |
| OpenAlex | W2090956511 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Critics of deontology have long noted that its proscriptions seem para doxical since, in contrast with welfare utilitarianism, they forbid some acts that maximize welfare overall. Recently some philosophers have suggested that deontology harbors a special paradox; that thinking cer tain actions morally objectionable—for example, rape—it forbids mini mizing such actions by doing one.1 For example, Samuel Scheffler states the following about a deontological constraint
Applied philosophy · Consequentialism · Deontological ethics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Immorality · Moral evil · Moral philosophy · Morality · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |