Rage against the authority machines
How to design artificial moral advisors for moral enhancement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20397802 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ethan Landes (0000-0002-1186-1717, University of Zurich), Cristina Voinea (0000-0003-4654-0697, University of Oxford, corresponding author), Radu Uszkai (0000-0001-5250-8015, University of Bucharest) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 2237-2248 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | AI & Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5666 • E-ISSN: 1435-5655 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s00146-024-02135-3 |
| PMID | 40385506 |
| OpenAlex | W4404877297 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 34 |
This paper aims to clear up the epistemology of learning morality from artificial moral advisors (AMAs). We start with a brief consideration of what counts as moral enhancement and consider the risk of deskilling raised by machines that offer moral advice. We then shift focus to the epistemology of moral advice and show when and under what conditions moral advice can lead to enhancement. We argue that people’s motivational dispositions are enhanced by inspiring people to act morally, instead of merely telling them how to act. Drawing upon these insights, we claim that if AMAs are to genuinely enhance people morally, they should be designed as inspiration and not authority machines. In the final section, we evaluate existing AMA models to shed light on which holds the most promise for helping to make users better moral agents
Art · Moral authority · Moral disengagement · Performing arts · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Learning from Words
Unfit for the Future
In defense of moral testimony
AI Moral Enhancement
Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates
Is Your Computer Lying? AI and Deception
Philosophical producers, philosophical consumers, and the metaphilosophical value of original texts
Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance
The Illusion of Moral Superiority
Socratic nudges, virtual moral assistants and the problem of autonomy
Moral Deskilling and Upskilling in a New Machine Age
Blame It on the AI? On the Moral Responsibility of Artificial Moral Advisors
Toward an Ethics of AI Assistants
The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence
Testimony and knowing how
Meaning
Moral Testimony
The Value of Understanding
Contemporary virtue ethics
Skilling and deskilling
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |