Ascriptions and Pseudoascriptions of Mental States

Bibliographic Data

ID20401002
AuthorsArne Poulsen (University of Copenhagen, corresponding author)
Year2000
Volume10
Issue2
Pages197-213
Publication date2000-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheory & Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0959354300102003
OpenAlexW2076638578
LanguageEN
References cited13

The ascription of normative mental states is an integral part of the psychology of development and personality. Pragmatic rules for the ascription of mental states are outlined and a distinction is made between direct and counterdefined mental states. According to these rules, counterdefined mental states can only be ascribed to persons in a meaningful way when certain conditions hold. Violations of the rules are called pseudoascriptions. Six counterdefined groups of mental states are discussed: secure, self-confident, authentic, free, intentional and identity. It is argued that certain psycho-social conditions create the need for ascriptions of these mental states, and that pseudoascriptions give rise to Cartesian narratives of the self. The rules for the ascription of counterdefined states has implications for the universality claims of normative descriptions of developmental psychology

Ascription · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Introspection · Linguistics · Mental state · Narrative · Normative · Theory of mind · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Child and Animal Learning Development · Cultural Differences and Values · Psychology · Social Psychology

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