Karen Barad, psychology, and subject models

Why we need to take experience seriously

Bibliographic Data

ID20401191
AuthorsSebastian Tobias-Renstrøm (0000-0002-0458-3990, University of Copenhagen, corresponding author), Simo Køppe (0000-0002-8792-0357, University of Copenhagen)
Year2020
Volume30
Issue5
Pages638-656
Publication date2020-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheory & Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0959354320903089
OpenAlexW3007840738
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited22

Postmodern theories on the subject are very diverse. In this article, we take a closer look at physicist and philosopher Karen Barad’s work in the emerging field of new materialism as an example of postmodern theory. The aim is to analyze Barad’s subject model as such and what it entails for doing the science of psychology. We will do this by analyzing Barad’s notion of the subject through three different types of subject models. This analysis will then be supplemented by a critical inquiry into Barad’s subject model by way of phenomenology. We conclude that Barad’s subject model is unfit for studying the subject in psychology as she leaves no room for the universal characteristic of experiential life, which makes it impossible to generalize psychological findings—a necessity in science—and that this criticism could apply to other subject models like hers in postmodern theory

Art · Criticism · Epistemology · Literature · Materialism · Postmodernism · Psychoanalysis · Sociology · Computer Science · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Posthumanist Ethics and Activism · Psychology

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