Loyalty over Meritocracy? Appointment of University Leaders in Russia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20413166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daria Gerashchenko (0000-0002-0990-6648, European University at Saint Petersburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-11 |
| Publication date | 2026-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Problems of Post-Communism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1075-8216 • E-ISSN: 1557-783X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10758216.2026.2653506 |
| OpenAlex | W7166877640 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 34 |
Does direct appointment of officials in authoritarian settings enhance efficiency? Autocrats favor appointments over elections to reduce uncertainty, yet outcomes vary. Assuming rectors are political actors, this study examines how university leader appointments versus elections affect university performance in Russia. Using indicators such as student entry exam scores, faculty salaries, and research publications, findings challenge the official claim that direct appointments improve performance
Government (linguistics) · Loyalty · Work (physics) · Academic Freedom and Politics · Higher Education Governance and Development · Russia and Soviet political economy
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| Highly cited | No |
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