Mechanism is not enough
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20484142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark H Bickhard (0000-0003-3859-9437, Lehigh University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 573-585 |
| Publication date | 2007-12-21 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pragmatics & Cognition (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0929-0907 • E-ISSN: 1569-9943 |
| Publisher | John Benjamins Publishing Company (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1075/pc.15.3.10bic |
| OpenAlex | W1994118598 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
I will argue that mechanism is not sufficient to capture representation, thus cognition. More generally, mechanism is not sufficient to capture normativity of any sort. I will also outline a model of emergent normativity, representational normativity in particular, and show how it transcends these limitations of mechanism. To begin, I will address some illustrative attempts to model representation within mechanistically naturalistic frameworks, first rather generally, and then in the cases of the models of Fodor and Millikan
Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Naturalism · Political science · sort · Computer Science · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Semantic Web and Ontologies
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |