Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant

Bibliographic Data

ID20510396
AuthorsMarcel Van Ackeren (Mansfield University, corresponding author), Martin Sticker (0000-0003-4895-4359, Trinity College Dublin, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume23
Issue3
Pages407-428
Publication date2018-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1369415418000225
OpenAlexW2888169661
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited31

We discuss Kant’s conception of moral rationalism from the viewpoint of recent debates, which have distinguished different forms of moral rationalism. We argue that Kant’s version, ‘silencing’, is different and stronger than currently held versions of moral rationalism and that it also differs from versions of silencing that contemporary thinkers advocate. We then discuss Kant’s version of silencing in the context of the moral demandingness debate and argue that silencing can make a perfect duty very demanding. However, it is important that whilst in cases of conflict between duty and personal happiness the normative standing of the latter is silenced, silencing does not require that agents do all they can in the case of imperfect duties. We finally indicate the kind of latitude imperfect duties allow for, according to Kant’s strong form of moral rationalism

Duty · Epistemology · Happiness · Imperfect · Normative · Political science · Rationalism · Sociology · Theology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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