The Form of Evil

Bibliographic Data

ID20510427
AuthorsIrit Samet (0000-0002-3140-541X, The King's College, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume14
Issue2
Pages93-117
Publication date2010-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1369415400001485
OpenAlexW2101222374
LanguageEN
References cited12

Upon arriving in Auschwitz Primo Levi discovered that rational discourse, in which actions are done for reasons, was left lying on the carriage floor together with his human dignity. By responding ‘Here one doesn't ask why’, the camp guard succinctly conveys the insight that evil defies reason. This paper examines two studies of evil that are predicated on that idea: Kant's and Augustine's. It argues that their theories share an underlying formation wherein evil remains incomprehensible, except in negative terms as an absence of the reasonable. This deep similarity in the structure of the concept of evil is exceptionally striking if we bear in mind the radical difference in the scope of its application: whereas for Augustine ‘evil’ is a general metaphysical concept that concerns everything that goes wrong in creation, for Kant it is limited to agents and what they do. My argument is that the privative structure which underlies their understanding of evil stems from a shared belief in the central role of rationality in ethical discourse, and in an absolute dependence of moral responsibility on free will

Dignity · Epistemology · Lying · Metaphysics · Political science · Problem of Evil · Rationality · Law · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Violence, Religion, and Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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