The Grammatical Background of Kant's General Logic

Bibliographic Data

ID20510508
AuthorsKurt Mosser (University of Dayton, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume13
Issue1
Pages116-140
Publication date2008-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1369415400001114
OpenAlexW2130533790
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited20

In the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant conceives of general logic as a set of universal and necessary rules for the possibility of thought, or as a set of minimal necessary conditions for ascribing rationality to an agent (exemplified by the principle of non-contradiction). Such a conception, of course, contrasts with contemporary notions of formal, mathematical or symbolic logic. Yet, in so far as Kant seeks to identify those conditions that must hold for the possibility of thought in general, such conditions must hold a fortiori for any specific model of thought, including axiomatic treatments of logic and standard natural deduction models of first-order predicate logic. Kant's general logic seeks to isolate those conditions by thinking through – or better, reflecting on – those conditions that themselves make thought possible

Axiom · Classical logic · Contradiction · Description logic · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · First-order logic · Linguistics · Natural deduction · Philosophy of logic · Predicate logic · Rationality · Computer Science · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification · Artificial Intelligence

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