Double Prevention and Powers

Bibliographic Data

ID21159752
AuthorsStephen Mumford (0000-0001-9614-4399, University of Nottingham), Rani Lill Anjum (0000-0002-0632-444X, University of Nottingham), Rani Anjum
Year2009
Volume8
Issue3
Pages277-293
Publication date2009-10-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Critical Realism (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1476-7430 • E-ISSN: 1572-5138
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1558/jocr.v8i3.277
OpenAlexW1968718327
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited12

Does A cause B simply if A prevents what would have prevented B? Such a case is known as double prevention: where we have the prevention of a prevention. One theory of causation is that A causes B when B counterfactually depends on A and, as there is such a dependence, proponents of the view must rule that double prevention is causation. However, if double prevention is causation, it means that causation can be an extrinsic matter, that the cause and effect need not be connected by a continuous chain of events, that there can be causation by absence, and that there can be causation at a distance. All of these implications jar with strong intuitions we have about the nature of causation. There is, on the other hand, a theory of causation based on an ontology of real dispositions, where causation involves the passing around of powers. This theory in contrast entails that double prevention is not causation and, on this issue, it can claim a victory over the counterfactual dependence account

Causation · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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