The Causal Closure Principle
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4352168 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sophie Gibbs (corresponding author), Sophie Gibb (Durham University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 261 |
| Pages | 626-647 |
| Publication date | 2015-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqv030 |
| OpenAlex | W2105140708 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 23 |
In the mental causation debate, there is a common assumption that interactive dualism is false because of the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. However, this paper argues that recent advances in metaphysics-more specifically, in the philosophy of causation-reveal a serious, general flaw in contemporary formulations of this principle
Causality (physics · Causation · Closure (psychology · Dualism · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Physics · Political science · Supervenience · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,71 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |