Expert Impressions in Stoicism

Bibliographic Data

ID21291600
AuthorsMáté Veres (0000-0001-5680-5922, University of Toronto Collaborative Specialization in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Jackman Humanities Building, Room 424, 170 St. George Street, Ontario M5R 2M8 Toronto CA, corresponding author), David Machek (0000-0001-8560-605X, Universität Bern Institut für Philosophie Länggassstrasse 49a, 3012 Bern CH)
Year2023
Volume105
Issue2
Pages241-264
Publication date2023-06-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-9101 • E-ISSN: 0943-3988
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/agph-2021-0038
OpenAlexW3200724132
LanguageEN
References cited38

We focus on the question of how expertise as conceived by the Stoics interacts with the content of impressions. In Section 1, we situate the evidence concerning expert perception within the Stoic account of cognitive development. In Section 2, we argue that the content of rational impressions, and notably of expert impressions, is not exhausted by the relevant propositions. In Section 3, we argue that expert impressions are a subtype of kataleptic impressions which achieve their level of clarity and distinctness due to the contribution of expertise. In Section 4, we argue that the expertise in living well not only allows the wise person to assent correctly but also affects the content of her impressions. We suggest that these two models – one’s attitude toward an impression being informed by expertise, and one’s impressions being affected by expertise – might characterize distinct stages of cognitive development. Stoic wisdom is not only a matter of the way one assents to one’s impressions but also a matter of the condition of one’s soul and, consequently, of the kinds of impressions one even entertains. Expertise offers a model of how cognitive and discriminatory improvement through practice and effort can transform the non-wise into the wise. A reading on which the content of impressions is not exclusively propositional illuminates a further aspect of this transformation. If the same propositions are accessible through impressions with different non-propositional content, we can account for cases in which the novice and the expert entertain the same proposition

CLARITY · Cognition · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Linguistics · Perception · Proposition · Reading (process) · Section (typography) · Classical Antiquity Studies · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Philosophy · Psychology

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