The Compulsions of Stoic Assent

Bibliographic Data

ID23404153
AuthorsCharles Brittain (0000-0003-1104-2946, corresponding author)
Year2014
Pages332-355
Publication date2014-03-14
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueStrategies of Argument (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890477.003.0014
OpenAlexW2489765475
ISBN9780199890477
LanguageEN
Citations received13

This chapter offers a new interpretation of the role of assent in the Stoic theory of reason. Their theory holds that a judgment is the result of a conceptually distinct act of assent to an impression, i.e., to the perceptual and non-perceptual contents (of varying quality and reliability) we entertain. The chapter argues that even though it is tempting to think that rational creatures are virtually compelled to assent to so-called ‘kataleptic’ (‘clear and distinct’) impressions and to find such impressions forceful and irresistible, the Stoics did not hold this position; they thought that, while it is natural to assent to kataleptic impressions, there are cases in which we don’t assent to them, and indeed some in which it is right not to.

Classical Antiquity Studies · Psychology

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