The Pyrrhonist Rejection of Academic Epistemology

Bibliographic Data

ID23605366
AuthorsWhitney Schwab (University of Maryland, College Park, corresponding author)
Year2025
Pages614-636
Publication date2025-04-22
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueOxford Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190695170.013.30
OpenAlexW4409664859
ISBN9780190695170
LanguageEN
References cited15

This chapter considers whether, when Pyrrhonists reject the Academic Skeptics’ notion of the plausible impression (phantasia pithanê), they mean to report that they find all impressions equipollent (i.e., equal in their convincingness). It argues against a long-standing and widespread view that Pyrrhonists do discriminate among their impressions, and then explores the consequences of this position for other central elements of Pyrrhonism. In particular, this chapter maintains that Pyrrhonian Skeptics do not suspend judgment universally but rather assent to some impressions, form beliefs, and can engage in a wide range of actions. Finally, it argues that by recognizing that Pyrrhonists do not find all their impressions to be equipollent, Pyrrhonism is a more viable position than is often thought.

Epistemology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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