Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21293550
AutoresSebastian Schmidt (0000-0003-1912-9771, University of Zurich, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen102
Número1
Páginas48-64
Fecha de publicación2024-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2022.2055093
OpenAlexW4220896142
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas36

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate

Appeal · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Forgiveness · Moral responsibility · Nothing · Political science · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Free Will and Agency · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification