Perspective Lost

In this paper, I criticize the most prevalent positive argument for ethical nonnaturalism, the argument from ethical phenomenology. According to it, nonnatural entities are part of the best explanation of the phenomenology of ethical deliberation; therefore, nonnaturalism is true. The argument blinds out the external, empirically informed perspective on ethical deliberation. I argue that doing so is methodologically unwarranted unless we already knew that external evidence is irrelevant in metaethics. Many nonnaturalists believe in this irrelevance because they take ethics to be “autonomous,” “just too different,” or the like. To justify this claim, however, they need a phenomenology-independent argument—or else they’re going in circles. I conclude that solely phenomenology-based arguments for nonnaturalism fail. Consequently, nonnaturalists need to change their strategies and actively embrace the external perspective

Argument (complex analysis) · Ethical theories · Ethical theory · Perspective (graphical) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory