Mistaken Defense and the Unbundling of Rights
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21316004 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Clark (0000-0002-1090-2361, corresponding author), David J Clark (0000-0002-7954-3715) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 135 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 428-457 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/733914 |
| OpenAlex | W4408537982 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 19 |
Central to the ethics of harm is the project of developing a theory of when and why persons forfeit rights to not be harmed. I argue that standard accounts of forfeiture are too coarse-grained to make sense of a range of cases involving “merely apparent attackers.” Making sense of these cases requires that we distinguish between the forfeiture of rights and the forfeiture of the contingent, moral “perks” of those rights. Appreciating this distinction has various upshots for the theory of forfeiture and may also bear fruit in other domains of moral philosophy
Business · Economics · Industrial organization · Law and economics · Political science · Unbundling · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification
Defensive Killing
The Ends of HarmThe Moral Foundations of Criminal Law
The Demands of Necessity
Promises and Conflicting Obligations
Duty and Liability
The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense
Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons
Necessity in Self‐Defense and War
Refusing Protection
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |