Mismanaging Risk and the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis

Bibliographic Data

ID2133309
AuthorsJohn Kingston (0000-0003-3869-9788, corresponding author), Jeff Kingston
Year2012
Volume10
Issue12
Publication date2012-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJapan focus (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1557-4660 • E-ISSN: 1557-4660
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1557466012032354
OpenAlexW4410181839
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited4

Though global safety standards kept on improving, we wasted our time coming up with excuses for why Japan didn't need to bother meeting them." Madarame Haruki, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Commission, Diet testimony, 2/15/12The nuclear accident at Fukushima was precipitated by natural disaster, but poor risk management, including a failure to comprehend tectonic risk in the most earthquake prone country in the world, and an institutionalized complacency about risk, were major factors increasing the likelihood of a major accident and fumbling crisis response. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the utility operating the Fukushima Daiichi Plant, and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the government regulatory authority, mismanaged a range of risks - siting, seismic, tsunami, emergency preparedness and radiation - and it is this mismanagement that made Fukushima into Japan's Chernobyl. Investigations into the accident have established that the crisis response was improvised and inadequate because of lack of preparation, institutional flaws in emergency procedures, and poor communication within the government and between officials and TEPCO

Fukushima Nuclear Accident · Nuclear physics · Nuclear power plant · Physics · Political science · Risk Perception and Management

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