Alternative possibilities in context
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335150 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alex Kaiserman (0000-0002-7209-5980, Kaiser Permanente, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1308-1324 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-26 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2021.1904646 |
| OpenAlex | W3144829630 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 26 |
Frankfurt cases are often presented as counterexamples to the principle that one is morally responsible for one’s action only if one could have acted otherwise. But ‘could have acted otherwise’ is context-sensitive; it’s therefore open to a proponent of this principle to reply that although there is a salient sense in which agents in Frankfurt-style cases couldn’t have acted otherwise, there’s another, different sense in which they could have, and it is this latter sense which is relevant to what we are morally responsible for doing. In this paper, I will evaluate the prospects of this contextualist response. I will argue that despite some initial signs of promise, the response fails, for reasons that were clearly anticipated in Frankfurt’s original paper
Action (physics) · Common sense · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Political science · Salient · Sociology · Style (visual arts) · Free Will and Agency · History · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |