Illusionism about virtual causation

Bibliographic Data

ID21335620
AuthorsMatej Kohár (0000-0002-1655-4070, Institute of History and Philosophy of Science, Technology and Literature, Technical University Berlin, Berlin, Germany, corresponding author)
Year2024
Pages1-26
Publication date2024-09-16
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2024.2403142
OpenAlexW4402803118
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited21

The question whether there are virtual objects grows more salient, as virtual reality (VR) technology becomes commercially viable. Arguments for realism about virtual objects rely on virtual causation. This paper argues that current accounts of virtual causation (both realist and irrealist) are inadequate – realists oversimplify the relation between virtual objects, virtual events, and their digital counterparts, while irrealists conflate virtual objects with their on-screen representations. Once these issues are rectified, it becomes clear that virtual causation is illusory, because the presumed structure of causal interactions between virtual objects does not map onto the structure of causal interactions between underlying computational objects and processes. Thus, the key realist contention that the causal interactions between virtual objects reveal their identity with the underlying computational objects and processes (digital objects) cannot be sustained. I conclude that an appropriate understanding of virtual causation favours irrealism about virtual objects

Causation · Epistemology · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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