Was nietzsche a moral relativist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335645 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paolo Stellino (0000-0002-2503-7761, NOVA Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA), NOVA University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1407-1428 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-16 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2025.2591734 |
| OpenAlex | W4416613189 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 23 |
Nietzsche has long been associated with relativism of some sort, particularly in relation to moral values, although contemporary Nietzsche scholars tend to dismiss this interpretation as misleading. Surprisingly, the secondary literature on this topic is not extensive, and to date, there seems to be no in-depth study dedicated to assessing the reasons for which we should or should not regard Nietzsche as a moral relativist. This article aims to provide an answer to this question. To this end, I will first offer some preliminary methodological remarks, particularly addressing the potential objection of anachronism that might be leveled against the use of contemporary notions and definitions of moral relativism. Next, I will distinguish among three different subcategories of moral relativism and assess whether each can be attributed to Nietzsche. Finally, I will draw conclusions
Anachronism · Interpretation (philosophy) · Moral psychology · Moral relativism · Relation (database) · Relativism · Augustinian Studies and Theology · Reformed Theology and Governance · Religious, Philosophical, and Educational Studies
| Highly cited | No |
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